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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Ever since the days of Van Gend en Loos
1
 and Costa,
2
 national attitudes to the unilaterally 
proclaimed supremacy of EU law have invariably captured a great deal of academic and 
political attention. Since the mid-1990s
3
 most national constitutional courts have converged 
to the interpretative orthodoxy of a qualified acceptance of primacy,
4
 couched in a pluralist 
vision of the relationship between the EU and its Member States.
5
 As things stand at the 
moment, and especially against the backdrop of Declaration 17 of the Lisbon Treaty, primacy 
is expected to be the constitutionally recognised conflict resolution norm that national courts 
shall turn to in almost all circumstances. 
The Greek Council of State in its judgment 3470/2011 does not break this pattern, 
even in the face of a politically sensitive issue. When considering whether an irrebuttable 
presumption of incompatibility between tenderers for public works contracts and owners or 
main shareholders of media corporations is permissible under EU law, the Greek court 
unequivocally accepts the relevant ECJ preliminary ruling in Michaniki
6
 and recalibrates its 
interpretation of the national constitution accordingly. In doing so, however, the Council of 
State reads an obligation for consistent interpretation into the constitution itself, thus turning 
the doctrine of indirect effect into a pragmatic tool for constitutional pluralism in action. 
 
 
  
LEGAL BACKGROUND
7
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 ECJ 5 February 1963, Case 26-62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v 
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration. 
2
 ECJ 15 July 1964, Case 6-64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. 
3
 In 1996 the German Constitutional Court set the tone for the qualified acceptance of primacy post-Maastricht 
with its seminal Brunner decision. See Bundesverfassungsgericht (2. Senat) (Federal Constitutional Court,  2nd 
Chamber) 12 October 1993, Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92, Manfred Brunner and Others v The European 
Union Treaty [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57. 
4
 Instead of many see D. Chalmers, G. Davies and G. Monti, European Union Law: Cases and Materials (CUP 
2010), pp. 194 et seq. 
5
 On constitutional pluralism within a European Union context see generally M. Avbelj and J. Komárek (eds.), 
Constitutional pluralism in the European Union and beyond (Hart, 2012).  
6
 ECJ 16 December 2008, Case C-213/07, Michaniki AE v. Ethniko Simvoulio Radiotileorasis and Ipourgos 
Epikratias [hereinafter Michaniki]. 
7
 For a factual background of the case see V. Kosta, ‘European Court of Justice Case C213/07, Michaniki AE v. 
Ethniko Simvoulio Radiotileorasis, Ipourgos Epikratias’, European Constitutional Law Review, 2009, 5, pp. 501 
516, at 501-503. 
 Legal proceedings before Greek administrative courts started with the applicant, Michaniki, 
seeking annulment of the certificate of financial independence issued to Erga OSE
8
 by the 
ESR.
9
 The competent fourth Chamber of the Greek Council of State, which was first seized, 
decided to refer the case to the Plenary
10
 due to the importance of the matter at hand.
11
 In 
doing so, however, the chamber was divided both on the correct interpretation of Directive 
93/37/EEC
12
 and, most significantly, on the permissibility
13
 or usefulness of a preliminary 
reference to the Court of Justice under the circumstances. The majority opinion reasoned that 
there is no possibility of conflict between Article 24 of the Directive,
14
 which enumerates the 
grounds on which a contractor may be excluded from participation in public works contracts, 
and Article 14(9) of the Greek Constitution,
15
 which introduces an irrebuttable presumption 
of incompatibility between tenderers for public works contracts and owners or main 
shareholders of media corporations, because there is no regulatory overlap in the material 
scope of the two provisions. The grounds of exclusion of tenderers provided for in Article 24, 
in this view, relate solely to instances of ‘professional incompatibility’ [emphasis added],16 
while the Greek Constitution creates an incompatibility of a ‘different nature’ for reasons of 
overriding public interest.
17
 This would fall outside the scope of Article 24 and remain 
permissible insofar as neither the Directive nor any other secondary EU law instrument has 
harmonised public procurement rules in their entirety.  
This line of argument, however, was not unanimously accepted. In a thorough and 
well-considered dissenting opinion, two members of the chamber argued that Article 24 of 
the Directive appears to lay down an exhaustive list of grounds for the exclusion of tenderers 
according to the authoritative interpretation of the Court of Justice.
18
 As a result, the 
dissenting judges observed that a preliminary reference was necessary in order to clarify 
whether the Greek system that established an absolute incompatibility on different grounds 
was, in fact, compatible with EU law. The majority in the chamber responded by pointing out 
that a preliminary reference is ‘inconceivable’ when the national rule in question is of 
constitutional nature.
19
 According to this view, the authority of EU law in the domestic legal 
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9
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11
 Greek Council of State (4
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 chamber), judgment 3242/2004, 16-11-2004.  
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 Council Directive 93/37/EEC concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works 
contracts, OJ [1993] L 199, 14.6.1993, as amended by European Parliament and Council Directive 97/52/EC OJ 
[1997] L 328, 13.10.1997. 
13
 Under Greek constitutional rules and especially in view of Article 110 of the Greek Constitution.  
14
 The Directive was incorporated into the domestic legal order through Law 3021/2002. 
15
 The relevant section of Article 14(9) of the Greek Constitution reads as follows: ‘[…] The capacity of owner, 
partner, major shareholder or managing director of an information media enterprise, is incompatible with the 
capacity of owner, partner, major shareholder or managing director of an enterprise that undertakes towards 
the Public Administration or towards a legal entity of the wider public sector to perform works or to supply 
goods or services. The prohibition of the previous section extends also over all types of intermediary persons, 
such as spouses, relatives, financially dependent persons or companies. The specific regulations, the sanctions, 
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annulment of the pertinent contract […] shall be determined by law.’   
16
 Greek Council of State (4
th
 chamber), judgment 3242/2004, supra n. 11, para 18. 
17
 Ibid.  
18
 ECJ 10 February 1982, Case 76/81, SA Transporoute et travaux v Minister of Public Works; ECJ 17 
November 1993, Case C-71/92, Commission v Spain; ECJ 26 September 2000, Case 225/98, Commission v 
France.   
19
 Greek Council of State (4
th
 chamber), judgment 3242/2004, supra n. 11, para 19. 
order stems from Article 28 of the Greek Constitution,
20
 which makes it normatively 
impossible for either primary or secondary European rules to take precedence over national 
constitutional provisions. 
The Plenary of the Council of State followed a different interpretative route to the 
chamber judgment, which had already attracted a great deal of academic criticism in 
Greece.
21
 The Plenary decided that a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice was 
essential at least for reasons of procedural economy,
22
 as Article 24 of the Directive could not 
be regarded as acte claire.
23
 In doing so, it accepted that the application of national rules to 
the case at issue would depend on their compatibility with EU law
24
 and it dismissed the 
argument of the chamber that questions of application of national constitutional rules are ipso 
facto exempt from the preliminary reference procedure.
25
 Regarding Article 14(9) of the 
Greek Constitution the majority in the Plenary took the view that it established an irrebuttable 
presumption of incompatibility between owners, main shareholders or management 
executives of media undertakings and tenderers of public contracts.
26
           
It is the irrebuttable nature of the presumption, in fact, that renders national law 
incompatible with EU law according to the preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice in 
Michaniki.
27
 The Court explained that, in principle, Article 24 of the Directive provides an 
exhaustive list of grounds for exclusion of tenderers,
28
 but it accepted that member states 
have a certain discretion to adopt additional measures,
29
 insofar as these aim at safeguarding 
the general principles of equal treatment and transparency in public procurement.
30
 Although 
this was found to be the case with the Greek system,
31
 the latter failed to satisfy the 
proportionality principle
32
 due to the ‘automatic and absolute nature’33 of the presumption of 
incompatibility that it established.    
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 Which forms the constitutional basis of Greece’s accession to the European Union through Law 945/1979 
(FEK 170A). 
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24
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 Three members of the Plenary dissented, siding with the hard line of the majority in the chamber judgment 
that denied the possibility of a preliminary reference when the potential conflict involves a national 
constitutional rule, on grounds of Articles 87 para 2 and 93 para 4 of the Greek Constitution (Greek Council of 
State (Plenary), judgment 3670/2006, para 21). 
26
 Greek Council of State (Plenary), judgment 3670/2006, para 14. The majority in the Plenary did, however, go 
on to suggest that the presumption of incompatibility for intermediary persons (relatives of owners, main 
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3021/2002.  
27
 ECJ 16 Feb. 2008, Case C-213/07, Michaniki AE v. Ethniko Simvoulio Radiotileorasis, Ipourgos Epikratias 
28
 Ibid, para 43. 
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 Ibid, para 55. Advocate General Maduro in his Opinion explains that Article 24 of the Directive ‘has not 
effected a total harmonisation in the field of public works contracts’. See Opinion A.G. Maduro of 08.10.2008, 
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para 20. 
30
 Ibid, para 44.  
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 Ibid, para 60. 
32
 Ibid, paras 61 et seq. 
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 Ibid, para 66. 
 THE JUDGMENT 3470/2011 OF THE GREEK COUNCIL OF STATE 
 
The judgment of the Greek Council of State is effectively divided into three parts. The first 
part
34
 offers a brief overview of the factual background, as well as a summary of the domestic 
legal proceedings up to and including the decision to send a preliminary reference to the ECJ. 
The second part
35
 consists in a relatively detailed summary of the ECJ preliminary ruling in 
Michaniki, with translated sections of the reasoning quoted verbatim. In the final part
36
 the 
Greek Court develops its reasoning on the application of relevant national law, taking into 
account the preliminary ruling and focusing on the correct interpretation of the relevant 
provisions of the Greek Constitution.             
 
In this latter part of the judgment the Greek Court explains that exclusion from or 
nullity of the public works contract
37
 is not envisaged in Article 14(9) of the Greek 
Constitution as a compulsory sanction when the incompatibility occurs.
38
 In fact, a textual 
interpretation of the constitutional provision
39
 reveals that the ordinary legislature is entrusted 
with discretion to determine the appropriate sanctions in cases of incompatibility, ‘in view of 
the developing social and economic circumstances […] and of the State’s obligations as a 
Member State of the European Union’.40 The Court went on to observe that the objective of 
Article 14(9) is to ensure that the process of awarding public works contracts is free from 
‘undue influence’ from bidders that also have financial interests in the media sector.41 The 
provision, however, does not aim at curtailing ‘any general influence’ of media groups on the 
exercise of political power, which is part and parcel of their role in modern democratic 
societies. Consequently, Article 14 (9) allows the ordinary legislature to impose the sanction 
of exclusion or nullity only when the tenderer satisfying the conditions of incompatibility has 
‘also acted in an unlawful or unfair manner during the process in order to be awarded the 
public contract’.42                
The Court pointed out that this interpretation of Article 14 (9) resonates with the 
obligation to harmonise national constitutional provisions with rules of EU law, which stems 
from the interpretative declaration added to Article 28 of the Greek Constitution.
43
 Excluding 
tenderers solely on the basis of the presumption of incompatibility would fall foul of 
proportionality, which is a general principle common to both EU law and the national legal 
order.
44
 The Court concluded that Law 3021/2002
45
 was unconstitutional as a whole because 
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 Greek Council of State (Plenary), judgment 3470/2011, paras. 1-5. 
35
 Ibid, paras. 6-7. 
36
 Ibid, paras. 7-10, with the operative part of the judgment in para. 11.  
37
 In view of the presumption of incompatibility that Article 14 para 9 of the Greek Constitution establishes.  
38
 Ibid, para 9. 
39
 Which, in the Court’s view, coincides with the intentions of the constitutional legislator as expressed in the 
parliamentary discussions during the constitutional amendment proceedings in 2001.  
40
 Ibid.  
41
 On the objectives of the constitutional amendment of Article 14 see E. Venizelos, ‘Οι εγγυήσεις πολυφωνίας 
και διαφάνειας στα ΜΜΕ κατά το άρθρο 14 παρ. 9. Οι κανόνες ερμηνείας του Συντάγματος και οι σχέσεις 
Συντάγματος και Κοινοτικού Δικαίου’ [The Guarantees of Media Pluralism and Transparency in Article 14 (9). 
The Rules of Interpretation of the Constitution and the Relationship between the Constitution and Community 
Law], Nomiko Vima, 2005, p. 425.  
42
 Ibid. 
43
 The interpretative declaration added to Article 28 in the 2001 constitutional amendment reads as follows: 
‘Article 28 constitutes the foundation for the participation of Greece in the process of European integration’ 
[translated by the author from Greek].  
44
 Article 25 para 1 of the Greek Constitution.  
of the general and absolute exclusion of tenderers for whom the presumption of 
incompatibility applied.
46
    
 
 
COMMENTARY 
 
A Greek study in constitutional pluralism: Primacy through consistent interpretation    
 
Michaniki has been criticised for the ‘striking’,47 albeit apparently deliberate48 failure of the 
ECJ to acknowledge the constitutional dimension of the matter at hand.
49
 Finding that the 
Greek rules in question were in breach of EU law was, in fact, ‘unsurprising’,50 in view of 
previous case-law.
51
 Nonetheless, there is no denying that the breach in the present case is 
more closely connected to, even if not directly stemming from,
52
 a ‘national constitutional 
assessment’.53 Leaving aside the technical aspects of the specific legal enquiry for the 
moment, one cannot but wonder why the Court of Justice did not find it necessary or 
appropriate to make an explicit reference to the notion of primacy of EU Law,
54
 reminding its 
Greek counterpart of the long-established obligation to set aside conflicting national 
provisions
55
 even of constitutional normative calibre.
56
 The Luxembourg Court’s alleged 
choice to sweep the constitutional question under the proverbial carpet is further evidenced, 
according to this view, by the choice not to follow Advocate General Maduro
57
 in reiterating 
the Union obligation to respect the constitutional identity of its member states.
58
  
After the recent judgment of the Greek Council of State on the substance of the 
dispute, however, such attempts to decipher the intentions of the Court of Justice seem to be 
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 It should be noted that, while legal proceedings were pending before Greek administrative courts, two new 
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182.   
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 Greek Council of State (Plenary), judgment 3470/2011, para, 10. 
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 Kosta, supra n. 7, p. 509.  
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 V. Tzevelekos and S. Vetsika, ‘Report on Greece’ in G. Martinico and O. Pollicino (eds.), The National 
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Publishing, Groningen, 2010, pp. 225-251, at 13. 
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Simvoulio Radiotileorasis and Ipourgos Epikratias (C-213/07)’, 3 Public Procurement Law Review (2009) p. 79 
at p. 80.  
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 ECJ 3 March 2005 C-34/03, Fabricom SA v. État belge, para. 26.  
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53
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 ECJ 15 July 1964, Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L.; ECJ 8 September 2010, Case C-409/06, Winner 
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2008, C 115/344.  
55
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seq. 
56
 ECJ 17 December 1970, Case 11-70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle 
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v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and 
others, para 33. 
57
 Opinion A.G. Maduro in Michaniki, supra n. 6, para 31.  
58
 Articles 4(2) and 6(3) TFEU. 
beside the point. In underplaying the (potentially) constitutional root of the problem with the 
irrebuttable presumption of incompatibility, the Court of Justice invited the national court to 
assume its rightful role as ‘European court’.59 The latter was, in fact, able to resolve the 
conflict through an understanding of the relationship between EU law and national 
constitutional law
60
 that accords relative primacy
61
 to the former, while retaining the ultimate 
supremacy of the Greek constitution. This is, of course, far from ground-breaking, as the 
Greek Court did little more than follow in the recent footsteps of many of its European 
counterparts, most notably those of the German Federal Constitutional Court.
62
 What makes 
the Michaniki saga stand out, nonetheless, is the measured, albeit cryptic, way in which both 
the Court of Justice and the Greek Council of State appear to appreciate that the gap between 
the theory and practice of constitutional pluralism cannot be bridged without viewing 
primacy through the lens of indirect effect.
63
  
Insofar as the Greek Council of State is concerned, such realisation came slowly and 
gradually. The initial position
64
 was uncompromising and the fourth chamber appeared keen 
to sever any constitutional dialogue with the Court of Justice before it could even begin, by 
denying the very possibility of a preliminary reference that could question national 
constitutional supremacy. The chamber judgment was rightly criticised for completely 
disregarding the doctrine of primacy,
65
 while unnecessarily elevating the conflict with EU 
law onto a constitutional level.
66
 When the matter first came before the Plenary,
67
 however, it 
became evident that leaving the Court of Justice out of the equation was not a viable position. 
As explained earlier, the majority in the Plenary maintained that Article 14(9) of the Greek 
Constitution in and of itself establishes an irrebuttable presumption of incompatibility.
68
  
Nonetheless, the framing of the issue in the preliminary questions indicates that the 
Greek Court was, by that point, acutely aware of the need to avoid a direct conflict between 
the Greek Constitution and EU law. The key, in this regard, was not the irrebuttable nature of 
the presumption, but whether its very existence could be permitted under - or even despite of 
- the Directive. In its preliminary reference the Greek Court offered three possibilities
69
 for 
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 On the role of national courts in the European judicial hierarchy see J. Komarek, ‘In the Court(s) We Trust? 
On the Need for Hierarchy and Differentiation in the Preliminary Ruling Procedure’, 32 European Law Review 
(2007), p. 467; I. Maher, ‘National Courts as European Community Courts’, 14 Legal Studies (1994), p. 226.     
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 Instead of many see M. P. Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’, in N. 
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MLR (2002), p. 317. 
61
 Rather than ‘absolute primacy’. See A. von Bogdany and S. Schill, ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect 
for National Identity under the Lisbon Treaty’, 48 Common Market Law Review (2011), p. 1 at p. 3. 
62
 Lisbon (BVerfGE) 123, 267, 353 et seq. (English translation at 
<www.bverfg.de/en/decisions/es20090630_2bve000208en.html>) (2009); Honeywell (BVerfGE), Decision of 6 
July 2010, (2010) NJW, 3422, 3423 et seq. (English translation at 
<www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20100706_2bvr266106en.html>).  
63
 M. Ross, ‘Effectiveness in the European legal order(s): beyond supremacy to constitutional proportionality?’, 
31 European Law Review (2006), p. 476 at p. 493. 
64
 Greek Council of State (4
th
 chamber), judgment 3242/2004. 
65
 S. Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos, ‘Από την απόφαση του Συμβουλίου της Επικρατείας (Δ’ Τμ.) 3242/2004 στην 
απόφαση της Ολομέλειας του Συμβουλίου της Επικρατείας 3670/2006: Το Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας και οι 
συνταγματικές αρχές της έννομης τάξης ΕΚ/ΕΕ’ [From Judgment 3242/2004 of the Council of State (Fourth 
Chamber) to Judgment 3670/2006 of the Plenary of the Council of State: the Council of State and the 
Constitutional Principles of the EC/EU Legal Order], 3 Efimerida Dioikitikou Dikaiou (2007), p. 290.  
66
 E. Venizelos, supra n. 21, pp. 98-99. 
67
 Greek Council of State (Plenary), judgment 3670/2006. 
68
 Ibid, para 14. 
69
 Corresponding to the three preliminary questions. See Michaniki, supra n. 6, para 26. 
reconciling the two legal systems.
70
 Advocate General Maduro favoured the first solution, 
agreeing that the list of grounds for exclusion of tenderers under Article 24 of the Directive is 
not exhaustive,
71
 while the Court of Justice opted for the more complex second solution, 
whereby the exhaustive character of Article 24 extends only to ‘grounds for exclusion based 
on objective considerations of professional quality’.72 Additional grounds of exclusion are, 
therefore, permissible insofar as they are unrelated to the professional qualities of tenderers 
and are designed to further safeguard equality of treatment and transparency.
73
  
The importance of this finding cannot be overstated.
74
 Insofar as additional grounds of 
incompatibility are permissible in principle, the ball is back in the Greek court. Had the ECJ 
not found room for additional grounds, ‘saving’ the constitutional provision without openly 
defying primacy would require nothing short of contra legem interpretation by the Council of 
State, which goes above and beyond the duty of consistent interpretation bestowed upon 
national courts.
75
 The Council of State proved willing and able to employ all the tools in its 
arsenal in order to find a mutually acceptable compromise. Using a combined textual and 
historical interpretation of Article 14(9) Greek Constitution, the Greek Court concluded that 
neither the wording of the provision nor the intentions of the constitutional legislator imply 
that the sanction of exclusion or nullity can be imposed solely on grounds of the 
incompatibility.
76
 This is further reinforced by a teleological interpretation of both Article 
14(9), in view of its express aim to shield public procurement from ‘undue influence’ only,77 
and Article 28 Greek Constitution, in view of the interpretative declaration added to it with 
the constitutional amendment of 2001 that describes it as ‘the foundation for the participation 
of Greece in the process of European integration’. This enables the Council of State to read 
Article 28 as having a dual function. Article 28 is the primary constitutional basis for legal 
approximation between the Greek and the EU legal order, but it also creates a constitutional 
obligation to interpret all national law consistently with EU law.  
What the Council of State manages to do, therefore, is to effectively ‘transpose’ the 
doctrine of consistent interpretation into a domestic normative context and translate it into a 
quasi-autonomous constitutional obligation. From a doctrinal point of view, this entails that 
conflict between national constitutional rules and EU law is internalised. Competing rules are 
seen as entrenched in the constitutional legal order, with Article 28 ‘standing for’ the 
European rule. In this way, ultimate national constitutional supremacy remains intact in 
principle, with national courts expected to treat conflicts with EU law as ‘infra-
constitutional’. Resolving such conflicts, then, is no longer an issue of conflicting 
                                                          
70
 The three possibilities are as follows: a) the list of grounds for exclusion of tenderers under Article 24 of the 
Directive is not exhaustive; b) the list of grounds is exhaustive, but a national provision such as the one at issue 
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 Opinion of AG Maduro in Michaniki, supra n. 6, para 24. 
72
 Michaniki, supra n. 6, para 47. 
73
 Ibid, para 44, where further references to: ECJ 7 December 2000, Case C 94/99 ARGE Gewässerschutz v 
Bundesministerium für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, paragraph 24; ECJ 16 October 2003, Case C-421/01 
Traunfellner GmbH v Österreichische Autobahnen- und Schnellstraßen-Finanzierungs-AG (Asfinag), paragraph 
29. 
74
 Incidentally this approach is, in essence, identical to the one developed by the fourth chamber of the Council 
of State in its much criticised initial judgment 3242/2004.  
75
 ECJ 13 November 1990, Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA.; 
ECJ 16 December 1993, Case C-334-92 Teodoro Wagner Miret v Fondo de Garantía Salarial.  
76
 Greek Council of State (Plenary), judgment 3470/2011, para 9. 
77
 Undue influence, that is, that owners or main shareholders in the media sector may exert specifically with a 
view to achieving the award of a public works contract. 
sovereignties and can be dealt with through the standard methodological approach of 
systematic interpretation of constitutional provisions.
78
  
Although this line of reasoning provides an interesting specimen of constitutional 
pluralism in action, it does raise doubts as to the limits of judicial power to second-guess 
constitutional arrangements. The Council of State seems to elevate Article 28 of the Greek 
Constitution into a Grundnorm that should serve as the basic guideline for constitutional 
interpretation, at least within the scope of EU law. Such a doctrinal position, even if not 
necessarily implying an undesirable infra-constitutional normative hierarchy,
79
 does beg the 
question of how far national courts can push the European integration agenda without 
rewriting the constitution. In the present case, the Council of State reverses the burden of 
proof implied by Article 14 of the Constitution, through finding that a tenderer with financial 
or family links to the media sector can only be excluded if ‘he is proved to have acted 
unlawfully or unfairly’.80 In theory,81 the Greek Court could have simply read Article 14(9) as 
allowing the tenderer to challenge the presumption of incompatibility before the deciding 
authority (ESR) or national courts. Instead, it effectively writes the presumption off 
altogether and renders the incompatibility utterly meaningless. It is obvious that, if a tenderer 
acts unlawfully, the ‘stricter’ penalty of exclusion or nullity can be imposed regardless of 
whether the tenderer has any financial or family links to the media sector. In the light of this 
unavoidable conclusion, the Council of State’s proclamations of deference to the 
constitutional legislator scattered throughout the judgment are normatively empty.  
 
 
Constitutional conflict and the common principle of proportionality 
 
The question that remains is whether the Council of State was, indeed, in a position to follow 
the interpretative route suggested above in view of the preliminary ruling in Michaniki. Once 
the substantive issue is stripped down to the bone, the legality of the Greek rules under 
scrutiny boils down to a question of proportionality. In theory, this enables the judicial 
dialogue between the ECJ and national courts to be carried out on the same normative 
register, given that proportionality is both a general principle of EU law
82
 and an integral part 
of national constitutions,
83
 including of course the Greek one. The Court of Justice often 
acknowledges that national courts may be better placed to apply the standard proportionality 
test
84
 and gauge whether the particular measure is the least restrictive means of achieving the 
legitimate public aim it pursues.
85
 In this case, however, the preliminary ruling seems to pre-
empt a proportionality assessment at the national level, by proclaiming that an automatic and 
absolute exclusion of a category of tenderers is by default disproportionate.
86
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This reading of Michaniki enables the Council of State to argue that the irrebuttable 
presumption could not have been a genuine constitutional choice as it contravenes the 
principle of proportionality. On the same token, the Greek court did not discuss the 
possibility that the incompatibility itself was a necessary, suitable and not excessively 
restrictive means of achieving the desired objective.
87
 It is conceivable, at least, that the 
presumption of incompatibility was, in fact, the least restrictive option available to the 
legislator at the time, given the Greek socio-political climate during the constitutional 
amendment of 2001.
88
 The point was actually picked up by a member of the minority opinion 
in the referring judgment to the Court of Justice, who defends the proportionate character of 
the presumption as the only effective means of shielding public procurement from undue 
influences.
89
 Disappointingly, the plenary of the Council of State in judgment 3470/2011 also 
fails to consider whether a rebuttable presumption of incompatibility would satisfy the 
proportionality test.   
The silence of the Council of State on the matter is at once illuminating and puzzling. 
A rebuttable presumption would not be absolute in nature, but it would still exclude a 
category of tenderers automatically. Although Michaniki is not explicit as to whether both 
characteristics need to be absent for the measure to pass the threshold of legality, the Council 
of State is clearly willing to opt for this ‘safer’ option and avoid the possibility of an 
interpretation that the ECJ might frown upon. Paradoxically, this cautious and conservative 
approach to the interpretation of EU law is coupled with an adventurous attitude towards the 
interpretation of the national constitution. What is puzzling, however, is that the objectives of 
European public procurement law may, in fact, be better served through a rebuttable 
presumption in the particular national context. The directives on public procurement 
essentially aim at fostering genuine competition in this field through removing national 
barriers to freedom of establishment and free movement of services.
90
 Such barriers can, of 
course, go beyond protectionist legislation. They may also take the form of corruption, 
clientelism or favouritism towards tenderers that can yield considerable political influence 
through their position in the mass media sector.
91
 The incompatibility established by Article 
14(9) of the Greek Constitution was devised specifically as a safeguard against such 
distortions of competition, in the spirit of primary and secondary EU competition law. One 
cannot but wonder, then, how the Council of State, although better placed than the ECJ to 
appreciate the idiosyncrasies of the Greek situation, engaged with proportionality only 
superficially.      
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 Judgment 3470/2011 of the Greek Council of State is an interesting specimen of how 
constitutional pluralism can inspire acceptable compromises in ‘hard cases’ of constitutional 
conflict. Admittedly, there is nothing revolutionary in the qualified acceptance of primacy on 
the part of the Greek Council of State. Nonetheless, the methodology employed by the Greek 
court in attempting to reconcile national constitutional supremacy with the effective rewriting 
of the Greek Constitution should provide food for thought to constitutional and European 
lawyers across the Union. By internalising indirect effect and treating it as an obligation 
emanating from the national constitution, the Council of State manages to situate itself within 
the European judicial hierarchy without openly defying the limits of its democratic mandate 
under the national constitutional order.  
Elegant as this interpretative solution may seem, it does beg the question of whether 
the substantive legal issue was successfully resolved in this case. Primacy through indirect 
effect may be an intelligent legal construct to mitigate the tensions created when national 
judiciaries are seen as sidestepping constitutional arrangements in favour of EU law. 
However, the constitutional conflict here was not one born out of protectionist or anti-
European national instincts, but out of the apparent zeal of the constitutional legislator to 
align with the fundamental principles of EU public procurement law in the face of 
substantially idiosyncratic national circumstances. Whether or not the irrebuttable 
presumption was a step too far, therefore, is a matter dealt with through the lens of 
proportionality, which is a common denominator in the constitutional traditions of Member 
States. Although proportionality may very well be the European mechanism par excellence to 
resolve constitutional conflicts of this sort,
92
 the ECJ seems satisfied in this case with a 
formalistic application of the doctrine that allows for little more than a light-touch assessment 
of the national context. Despite the good intentions of the Greek court, then, it is difficult to 
see how the ‘primacy through indirect effect’ paradigm can serve its purpose without a 
simultaneous show of faith by the ECJ vis-à-vis its national counterparts.      
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